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Resolving the Conflict Between the 
Stolen Valor Act of 2005 and the First 
Amendment 
INTRODUCTION 
In May 2010, the New York Times unveiled a series of 
misstatements regarding the military career of Connecticut’s 
Democratic Senate candidate, Richard Blumenthal.1 As early as 
2000, Mr. Blumenthal was believed to be a Vietnam War 
veteran.2 Not only did he expressly state, “I served in Vietnam,” 
but he also described the anguish he suffered as a result of the 
criticism and cynicism he and his “fellow” veterans endured 
when they came home.3 Although he made these misstatements 
for years, Mr. Blumenthal never served overseas.4 From 1965 
through 1970, Mr. Blumenthal reportedly received five draft 
deferments; three were educational deferments and two were 
occupational.5 Once Mr. Blumenthal exhausted his potential 
deferments and drew a very low number in the draft lottery, he 
secured a position with the Marine Corps Reserve and avoided 
the battlefield.6 Although Mr. Blumenthal took “full 
responsibility” for these false claims once they were uncovered, 
  
 1 David M. Halbfinger & James Barron, Campaign in Damage Control Over ‘a Few 
Misplaced Words,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2010, at A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/05/19/nyregion/19reax.html?ref=nyregion; Raymond Hernandez, Candidate’s Words on 
Vietnam Service Differ from History, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/nyregion/18blumenthal.html.  
 2 Hernandez, supra note 1, at A1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id.; Halbfinger & Barron, supra note 1, at A3. 
 5 Occupational deferments were very rare, especially after President Lyndon 
B. Johnson’s administration drastically reduced graduate school deferments in 1968. 
Hernandez, supra note 1, at A1. 
 6 Id. 
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he emphasized that he simply “misspoke” and did not 
intentionally lie to the American public.7 
Shortly thereafter, the Washington Post began 
investigating the military history of Illinois Republican Senate 
candidate Mark Kirk.8 In his official biography and during a 
speech at a House committee hearing in March 2002, Mr. Kirk 
claimed that he was once the Navy’s Intelligence Officer of the 
Year.9 Aware that the Post investigation would disclose the 
inaccuracy of that statement and mindful of the Blumenthal 
debacle, Mr. Kirk acted.10 During the week of the media frenzy 
surrounding Blumenthal, Mr. Kirk blogged about the 
misrepresentation he had made in his biography.11 In actuality, 
the National Military Intelligence Association, a professional 
organization, gave the award to not just him, but his entire 
service unit, which had been based in Aviano, Italy, in 2000.12 
Mr. Kirk had also embellished his military career by claiming 
that he “served in the Gulf War,” “commanded the Pentagon 
war room,” and flew “intelligence missions over Iraq” while 
“under fire.”13 Though Mr. Kirk was in fact a member of the 
Navy Reserve beginning in 1989, these stories are simply not a 
part of his service record.14 Like Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Kirk 
came clean in the beginning of June and apologized for his 
misstatements.15 Despite lying about their military valor, both 
Mr. Blumenthal and Mr. Kirk were elected to the United 
States Senate in November 2010.16  
  
 7 Halbfinger & Barron, supra note 1, at A3. 
 8 R. Jeffrey Smith, Illinois Republican Senator Candidate Admits to Error on Navy 
Award, WASH. POST, May 30, 2010, at A03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/29/AR2010052903510.html. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Todd Lighty et al., Kirk Apologizes for Misstatements About Military Career, CHI. 
TRIB., June 30, 2010, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-06-03/news/ct-met-
mark-kirk-military-record-060420100603_1_military-gulf-war-democratic-senate.  
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id.; Smith, supra note 8. 
 15 Lighty, supra note 10. In a meeting with The Chicago Tribune, Kirk 
admitted that portions of his résumé regarding his military experience were 
embellishments and not as precise as they should be. He apologized for the 
“misstatements” and repeatedly indicated that they were “mistakes” due to an effort to 
translate technical terms to the voters and the carelessness of his campaign staff. Id.  
 16 Susan Haigh, Richard Blumenthal Defeats Linda McMahon in Connecticut 
Senate Race, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/02/ 
richard-blumenthal-defeats-lindamcmahon_n_765868.html?view=screen; Todd Lighty & Bob 
Secter, Kirk Captures Senate Seat, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/elections/ct-elect-senate-20101103,0,1866246,full.story. 
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In addition to public officials, private citizens are lying 
about their military valor as well.17 In many instances, 
individuals have gone further than Blumenthal or Kirk, 
claiming to have received some of the most noteworthy and 
honorable military awards, such as the Congressional Medal of 
Honor and the Purple Heart.18 
In light of a substantial increase in this behavior,19 
Congress enacted the Stolen Valor Act of 2005.20 The Act 
criminalizes the unauthorized wearing, selling, manufacturing, 
and distributing of military awards and decorations, as well as 
false representations regarding receipt of the awards made in 
written or spoken word.21  
Despite this congressional effort, courts have not 
consistently upheld the Act under the First Amendment. 
Section 704(b) of the Act is particularly problematic; it 
criminalizes false representations made “verbally or in 
writing.”22 Both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado have 
held that section 704(b) is a facially invalid, content-based 
  
 17 For example, an individual, Andrew Alexander Diabo, claimed to be “a 
wounded Marine helicopter pilot” in Afghanistan and Iraq and a West Point Cadet. He 
supported his untruths with a West Point uniform hanging in his closet and military 
medals such as a Purple Heart and Silver Star framed and hanging on the walls of his 
home. He used these lies about his military history to defraud numerous people, 
accumulating over a half million dollars in debt to these individuals. After the Marine 
Corps Inspector General’s Office in Washington warned Diabo to stop, Diabo 
disappeared before any federal officials could properly charge him with any crimes. 
Larry King, How a Local ‘War Hero’ Went AWOL, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 25, 2010, at 
A01; see also United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1185 (D. Colo. 2010) (order 
granting defendant’s motion to dismiss information) (The defendant, Rick Glen Strandlof, 
was charged for falsely claiming to have received a Purple Heart on four separate occasions 
and a Silver Star on another occasion.); United States v. McGuinn, No. 07 Cr. 471(KNF), 2007 
WL 3050502, at *1-5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2007) (memorandum and order) (The defendant, Louis 
Lowell McGuinn, after being discharged from the Army as a private, claimed that he was a 
lieutenant colonel and actually wore military medals such as the Silver Cross, Purple Heart, 
and Silver Star without ever having received the medals for his service. The state charged him 
under the Stolen Valor Act.); Christian Davenport, One Man’s Database Helps Uncover Cases 
of Falsified Valor, WASH. POST, May 10, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/09/AR20100509033.63.html (“The FBI investigated 200 stolen 
valor cases . . . and typically receives about 50 tips a month, triple the number that came in 
before the September 2001 terrorist attacks.”). 
 18 See sources cited supra note 17. 
 19 Davenport, supra note 17.  
 20 Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
 21 Id. 
 22 United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding the 
Stolen Valor Act of 2005 facially invalid under the First Amendment), cert. granted, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210); see also Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 
1192 (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss information because the Stolen Valor Act 
is unconstitutional under the First Amendment). 
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restriction under the First Amendment.23 In United States v. 
Alvarez, the Ninth Circuit concentrated on the question of 
whether “false statements of fact,” targeted by section 704(b), 
are protected by the First Amendment.24 The majority held that 
false statements are protected and, therefore, cannot be the 
predicate of criminal sanction unless the Act passes strict 
scrutiny.25 As a result of this conclusion, the court struck down 
section 704(b) because less restrictive alternative means were 
available to Congress.26 Similarly, in United States v. Strandlof, 
the District Court of Colorado found that the Act failed strict 
scrutiny.27 According to the court, the government failed to 
provide a compelling government interest in support of the Act.28  
By contrast, the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia found section 704(b) constitutional in United 
States v. Robbins.29 Directly conflicting with the Ninth Circuit, the 
court held that false statements of fact are not protected by the 
First Amendment.30 As a result of this finding, the Western 
District of Virginia did not apply strict scrutiny, but rather upheld 
the Act’s constitutionality under the overbreadth doctrine.31 
Overall, the constitutionality of section 704(b) has been 
inconsistently rejected among the lower courts.32 In response to 
the uncertainty presented by these courts’ decisions, on 
October, 17, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
  
 23 See, e.g., Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1217; Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1192. Under 
First Amendment jurisprudence, if the statute at issue is a content-based restriction on 
protected speech it is subject to the strict scrutiny test, see, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997); 
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972), which requires that the government show that 
the statute is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” Boos v. Barry, 
485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). By contrast, if the statute is a content-based restriction on a type 
of speech within a traditionally unprotected category, then it is not subject to strict scrutiny, 
but rather to less stringent analyses, such as the overbreadth and void-for-vagueness 
doctrines. See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
494-504 (1982); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973); Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-22 (1972). For a more detailed analysis of the overbreadth and 
void-for-vagueness doctrines, see infra Part II.C. 
 24 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1201-17. 
 25 Id. at 1217. 
 26 Id. at 1216-17. 
 27 Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.  
 28 Id. at 1189. 
 29 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 821 (W.D. Va. 2011). 
 30 Id. at 817. 
 31 Id. at 818-19. See Part II.C.1 for a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine. 
 32 Compare United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210), and Strandlof, 746 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1192, with Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 821. 
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United States v. Alvarez to determine whether the statute is 
facially invalid under the First Amendment.33  
Before certiorari was granted, Congress sought to 
uphold the initiative of the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 and 
proposed a new statute entitled the Stolen Valor Act of 2011.34 
The bill seeks to eliminate subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. § 704 and 
remedy the section’s flaws.35 The bill also expands the reach of 
section 704(b) by criminalizing misrepresentations about one’s 
“military service,” rather than just misrepresentations about 
the receipt of a military award or decoration.36 
This note examines section 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act 
of 2005 and the proposed Stolen Valor Act of 2011 under the 
First Amendment. It argues that both Acts are unconstitutional. 
Part I recounts the history of protecting military valor in 
America leading up to the enactment of the Stolen Valor Act of 
2005 and the introduction of the 2011 bill. Part II argues for 
section 704(b)’s unconstitutionality under First Amendment 
jurisprudence, and Part III discusses the unconstitutionality of 
the Stolen Valor Act of 2011. Additionally, this note suggests 
further change to the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 and calls upon 
state and local legislatures, in Part IV, to supplement these 
federal remedies. Specifically, Part IV suggests that Congress 
should restructure the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 to resemble a 
fraud statute. And furthermore, state and local legislatures, to 
hold public officials accountable, should impose an eligibility 
requirement prohibiting false claims of military valor and 
service by individuals seeking an elected position. 
I. PROTECTING MILITARY VALOR AND THE STOLEN VALOR 
ACT OF 2005 
Valor is defined as the “strength of mind or spirit that 
enables a person to encounter danger with firmness.”37 Derived 
from Middle English, Anglo-French, and Medieval Latin, valor has 
historically become synonymous with strength, worthiness, and 
  
 33 United States v. Alvarez, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210). 
 34 See Stolen Valor Act of 2011, H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011); see also 
Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1217 (9th Cir. 2010); Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1192; Robbins, 
759 F. Supp. 2d at 821.  
 35 See H.R. 1775 § 2. 
 36 Compare id., with Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006). 
 37 Valor Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/valor (last visited Aug. 8, 2011). 
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bravery.38 Moreover, valor has traditionally been used to 
characterize the distinguished bravery of members of the military.39 
In an effort to encourage, honor, and recognize military 
valor, numerous military awards and decorations have been 
created and awarded.40 Honoring members of the military is a 
tradition in the United States that dates back to the 1780s, when 
George Washington was President.41 As a former general, 
President Washington identified with a “desir[e] to cherish [the] 
virtuous ambition in his soldiers” exemplified through “instances 
of unusual gallantry . . . extraordinary fidelity, and essential 
service.”42 In 1782, President Washington created “honorary 
badges of distinction” to carry out his objective to “meet [valor] 
with [] due reward.”43 Included in these honorary badges was the 
predecessor to one of today’s most admirable military awards—
the Purple Heart.44 While introducing these badges and describing 
their purposes and importance, Washington also strongly 
  
 38 Id. 
 39 See, e.g., id. (As an example of the use of the word valor, the site uses, “The 
soldiers received the nation’s highest award for valor.”).  
 40 See, e.g., Medal of Honor, 10 U.S.C. § 3741 (2006) (awarded to a member of 
the Army who “distinguished himself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the 
risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty”); Distinguished-Service Cross, id. § 3742 
(awarded to a member of the Army who “distinguishes himself by extraordinary heroism 
not justifying the award of a medal of honor”); Distinguished-Service Medal, id. § 3743 
(awarded to a member of the Army who “distinguishes himself by exceptionally 
meritorious service to the United States in a duty of great responsibility”); Silver Star, id. 
§ 3746 (awarded to a member of the Army who “is cited for gallantry in action that does 
not warrant a medal of honor or distinguished-service cross”); Distinguished Flying 
Cross, id. § 3749 (awarded to a member of the Army who “distinguishes himself by 
heroism or extraordinary achievement while participating in an aerial flight”); Soldier’s 
Medal, id. § 3750 (awarded to a member of the Army who “distinguishes himself by 
heroism not involving actual conflict with an enemy”); Civil War Battle Streamers, id. 
§ 3753 (authorizes the wearing of these streamers to units and regiments in the Army 
entitled by the Secretary of the Army); Korea Defense Service Medal, id. § 3756 (awarded 
to qualifying members of the Army who served in the Republic of Korea or adjacent 
waters during the conflict in Korea); Purple Heart, id. § 1129 (awarded to a member of 
the armed forces “who is killed or wounded in action as the result of an act of an enemy of 
the United States”); see also Purple Heart, id. § 1131.  
 41 GENERAL ORDERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON ISSUED AT NEWBURGH ON THE 
HUDSON, 1782-1783, at 30-31 (Edward C. Boynton, ed., Newburgh, N.Y., E.M. 
Ruttenber & Son 1883) (Order of Aug. 7, 1782). 
 42 Id. at 30. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 30-31; see also 10 U.S.C. § 1129 (describing the Purple Heart as an award 
given to soldiers who have been “killed or wounded in action as the result of an act of the 
enemy of the United States”); Purple Heart, INSTITUTE OF HERALDRY, 
http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/Awards/purple_heart.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2011) 
(describing the background, criteria and components of the Purple Heart). For a list of 
United States military ribbons by superiority, see Ribbons—Order of Precedence, INSTITUTE 
OF HERALDRY, http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/Awards/order_of_precedence.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2011). 
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asserted that individuals who falsely represented themselves as 
recipients of the awards should “be severely punished.”45 
As the passage of the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 
demonstrates, Washington was not the only government official 
who sought to protect the reputation of the nation’s military 
awards.46 Originally, the Stolen Valor Act only criminalized the 
unauthorized wearing, manufacturing, or selling of military 
awards and decorations.47 In late 2005, however, Congress 
introduced an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 704 that enhanced the 
section’s protection.48 The amendment allows the prosecution of 
those who falsely claim receipt of military awards.49 The 
proposed amendment’s sponsor, former U.S. Congressman John 
Salazar, was inspired by the college thesis of a constituent, 
Pamela Sterner. In the thesis, Mrs. Sterner advocated for a 
criminal statute to police false claims of military valor.50 Upon 
  
 45 GENERAL ORDERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 41, at 30-31. 
 46 See Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006); Stolen Valor Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 3, 120 Stat. 3266. 
 47 Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 704 
(2006) (“Whoever knowingly wears, manufactures, or sells any decoration or medal 
authorized by Congress for the armed forces of the United States, or any of the service 
medals or badges awarded to the members of such forces, or the ribbon, button, or 
rosette of any such badge, decoration or medal, or any colorable imitation thereof, 
except when authorized under regulations made pursuant to law, shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.”). 
 48 See Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 151 CONG. REC. 
S12,684, S12,688 (Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kent Conrad) (“Recipients of the 
Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Awards, Silver Star, or Purple Heart have made 
incredible sacrifices for our country. They deserve our thanks and respect. Unfortunately, 
however, there are some individuals who diminish the accomplishments of award 
recipients by using medals they have not earned. These imposters use fake medals—or 
claim to have medals that they have not earned—to gain credibility in their communities. 
These fraudulent acts can often lead to the perpetration of very serious crimes. Currently, 
Federal law enforcement officials are only able to prosecute those who wear counterfeit 
medals. . . . My legislation will allow law enforcement officials to prosecute those who 
falsely claim, either verbally or in writing, to be medal recipients.”). 
 49 See id. 
 50 See Clay Calvert & Rebekah Rich, Low-Value Expression, Offensive Speech, 
and the Qualified First Amendment Right to Lie: From Crush Videos to Fabrications 
About Military Medals, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2010) (citing Tom Gottlieb, An Act 
for Valor Student’s Legislative Quest Ends with Congressional Approval, ROLL CALL, 
Dec. 11, 2006; Pamela M. Sterner, The Stolen Valor Act of 2005: Medal of Honor 
Legislative Changes-Title 18 (U.S.C.) (rev. July 13, 2005) (unpublished term paper, 
Colorado State University-Pueblo), available at http://www.homeofheroes.com/herobill/ 
legislation.pdf). Pamela Sterner has worked with her husband Doug, a Vietnam 
veteran, to lobby for better recognition of Congressional Medal of Honor recipients and 
the exposure of imposters. For example, the Sterners successfully lobbied for the 
enactment of legislation authorizing special license plates for recipients. Doug also 
created a website, entitled “Home of Heroes” where he posted a database with the 
names of over 120,000 actual recipients of military awards. Doug Sterner & Pam 
Sterner, Preserving the History of Recipients of the Medal of Honor, HOME OF HEROES, 
http://www.homeofheroes.com (last visited June 17, 2011); Davenport, supra note 17. 
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receipt of Mrs. Sterner’s submission, Mr. Salazar, a Vietnam 
veteran, sought to carry out her request.51 
This objective was accomplished by enacting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 704(b), which states, 
Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing, 
to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by 
Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States, any of the 
service medals or badges awarded to the members of such forces, the 
ribbon, button, or rosette of any such badge, decoration, or medal, or 
any colorable imitation of such item shall be fined under this title, 
imprisoned not more than six months, or both.52 
Additionally, while the original Act only included an 
enhanced punishment for unauthorized use of a Congressional 
Medal of Honor,53 the amended Act includes enhanced punishment 
for misrepresentations regarding a Navy cross, an Air Force cross, 
a Silver Star, or a Purple Heart.54 Instead of a fine and/or 
incarceration for up to six months, a misdemeanor of this type is 
punishable by a fine and/or incarceration for up to one year.55 
Within a short time, the bill had 111 cosponsors in the 
House of Representatives and twenty-seven cosponsors in the 
Senate.56 On December 20, 2006, the amendments were enacted 
  
Currently, military records are not up to par to aid in these investigations so much so 
that private individuals, such as Mr. Sterner, have taken it upon themselves to 
investigate and unveil these imposters. See id. Congress is, however, attempting to 
pass a bill to produce a public online database listing recipients of awards and all 
individuals who have served in the armed forces. See Military Valor Roll of Honor Act, 
H.R. 666, 111th Cong. § 1136 (2009). 
 51 See Calvert & Rich, supra note 50, at 16 (citing About John, SALAZAR FOR 
CONGRESS, http://www.salazarforcongress.com/about/bio (last visited Jan. 28, 2011)). 
 52 Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006). 
 53 Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 704(c) 
(2006) (“If a decoration or medal involved in an offense under subsection (a) is a 
Congressional Medal of Honor, in lieu of the punishment provided in that subsection, 
the offender shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.”); 
see also id. (defining a “Congressional Medal of Honor” as a medal awarded under 10 
U.S.C. § 3741 (1994), 10 U.S.C. § 6241 (1994), or 10 U.S.C. § 8741 (1994)). 
 54 Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(d) (2006) (“If a decoration or 
medal involved in an offense described in subsection (a) or (b) is a distinguished-service 
cross awarded under section 3742 of title 10, a Navy cross awarded under section 6242 
of title 10, an Air Force cross awarded under section 8742 of section 10, a silver star 
awarded under section 3746, 6244, or 8746 of title 10, a Purple Heart awarded under 
section 1129 of title 10, or any replacement or duplicate medal for such medal as 
authorized by law, in lieu of the punishment provided in the applicable subsection, the 
offender shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.”). 
 55 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 704(a), and § 704(b), with § 704(c), and § 704(d). 
 56 The Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status 109th Congress (2005-
2006) H.R. 3352 Cosponsors, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/ 
z?d109:HR03352:@@@P (last visited Sept. 22, 2011); The Library of Congress, Bill 
Summary & Status 109th Congress (2005-2006) S. 1998 Cosponsors, THOMAS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SN01998:@@@P (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).  
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into law and received widespread support.57 In fact, the Senate 
unanimously voted in favor of the Act.58 
Two states, using the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 as a model, 
adopted similar legislation shortly thereafter. Utah adopted the 
exact language of 18 U.S.C. § 704(b).59 Similarly, California 
enacted a statute criminalizing misrepresentations about one’s 
military history if the misrepresentations were made with the 
intent to defraud.60 California’s legislature also enacted a separate 
provision requiring public officials of the state to resign if they are 
convicted under the federal Stolen Valor Act of 2005.61  
Despite broad support in Congress, some courts have 
held the Act unconstitutional. As a result, Congress has 
already begun to revise it.62 On May 5, 2011, the House of 
Representatives introduced HR 1775, which repeals section 
704(b) and creates an entirely new statute entitled the Stolen 
Valor Act of 2011.63 
  
 57 Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, 120 Stat. 3266 (2006); see also 151 
CONG. REC. S9215-9216, S9215 (Sept. 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Bill Frist), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2006_record&page=S9215&position=all 
(explicating a unanimous Senate vote for the bill). 
 58 151 CONG. REC. S9215-9216, S9215 (Sept. 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Bill Frist), 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2006_record&page= 
S9215&position=all (explicating a unanimous Senate vote for the bill). 
 59 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-706 (West 2010). Utilizing similar language to 
that of the federal Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-9-706 states in part: 
(2) Any person who intentionally makes a false representation, verbally or in 
writing, that the person has been awarded a service medal is guilty of a class 
C misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person who wears, purchases, attempts to purchase, solicits for 
purchase, mails, ships, imports, exports, produces blank certificates of receipt 
for, manufactures, sells, attempts to sell, advertises for sale, trades, barters, 
or exchanges for anything of value a service medal, or any colorable imitation 
thereof, except when authorized by federal law, or under regulations made 
pursuant to federal law, with the intent to defraud, or with the intent to 
falsely represent that the person or another person has been awarded a 
service medal, is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
 60 CAL. PENAL CODE § 532b(c)(1) (West 2011) states, “any person who, orally, 
in writing, or by wearing any military decoration, falsely represents himself or herself 
to have been awarded any military decoration, with the intent to defraud, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor.” While this statute is similar to the federal criminal sanction, the 
federal version does not require an intent to defraud. See supra notes 52-54 for the 
language of the federal statute. The absence of such language was a problem addressed 
by the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210). 
 61 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 3003 (West 2010) (“An elected officer of the state or a 
city, county, city and county, or district in this state forfeits his or her office upon the 
conviction of a crime pursuant to the federal Stolen Valor Act of 2005 . . . .”). 
 62 Stolen Valor Act of 2011, H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). 
 63 Id. §§ 1-2. 
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The proposed statute provides, 
Whoever, with intent to obtain anything of value, knowingly makes 
a misrepresentation regarding his or her military service, shall—(1) 
if the misrepresentation is that such individual served in a combat 
zone, served in a special operations force, or was awarded the 
Congressional Medal of Honor, be fined under this title, imprisoned 
not more than 1 year, or both; and (2) in any other case, be fined 
under this title, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.64 
The proposed legislation provides an exception to 
prosecution if an individual falsely denies military service.65 
Furthermore, the statute creates a defense “if the thing of 
value is de minimis”66 and criminalizes not just false 
statements about the receipt of military awards but also 
misrepresentations about one’s military service in general.67 
The bill defines military service as follows: 
(A) service in the Armed forces of the United States;  
(B) service in a combat zone as a member of the Armed Forces of the 
United States;  
(C) attainment of a specific rank in the Armed Forces of the United 
States; and  
(D) receipt of– 
(i) any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the 
Armed Forces of the United States;  
(ii) any of the service medals or badges awarded to members 
of such forces; or  
(iii) the ribbon, button, or rosette of any such badge, 
decoration, or medal.68 
Due to this change in statutory language, the reach of 
the proposed legislation differs from section 704(b) of the 
Stolen Valor Act of 2005.69 For example, expansion of the crime 
as proposed would enable law enforcement to reach individuals 
like Blumenthal, who may not have the audacity to claim 
  
 64 Id. § 2. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Compare id., with Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
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falsely that they received a Congressional Medal of Honor,70 but 
who falsely claim to have served, for example, in Vietnam.71 
Further, instead of generally criminalizing misrepresentations 
regarding the receipt of military awards “verbally or in 
writing,” the proposed bill criminalizes conduct with mens rea 
components of knowledge and “intent to obtain anything of 
value.”72 The absence of a mens rea element in the Stolen Valor 
Act of 2005 was one of the main concerns of the courts that 
found it facially invalid under the First Amendment.73 
Interestingly, the 2011 bill does not provide a harm element 
either, which the Ninth Circuit and District of Colorado both 
suggested would be necessary for the Act to be constitutional.74 
II. APPLICATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE TO 
THE STOLEN VALOR ACT OF 2005 
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 has been analyzed under a 
variety of tests pursuant to First Amendment case law, which has 
contributed to inconsistent decisions as to the constitutionality of 
the Act.75 In anticipation of the Supreme Court’s review of the 
Act’s constitutionality,76 this section first demonstrates that the 
Act regulates protected speech based on its content. Then, this 
section explicates each of the applicable tests under the First 
Amendment and applies them to section 704(b). Ultimately, the 
Act is unconstitutional because it runs afoul of each of these tests 
and the Supreme Court should strike it down. 
  
 70 Xavier Alvarez claimed that he had received the Congressional Medal of 
Honor. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210). 
 71 Senate candidate Richard Blumenthal claims he misspoke about serving in 
Vietnam as opposed to in the Military Reserves. Hernandez, supra note 1, at A1. Any 
service in the military is noteworthy. But when a person claims he served in one (usually 
higher-ranking) capacity when he actually served in another, it is difficult to fathom that 
such a misrepresentation would be made unknowingly or unintentionally—unless the 
serviceman truly “misspoke” and later corrected himself. As a note, courts should not 
determine which service outweighs another; rather, courts should use the system the 
military has already established. For the Institute of Heraldry’s order of precedence for 
military ribbons, see INSTITUTE OF HERALDRY, supra note 44. 
 72 Stolen Valor Act of 2011, H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). 
 73 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1212; United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 
1183, 1188 (D. Colo. 2010) (order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss information). 
 74 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1216; Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1188. 
 75 Compare Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1217, and Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 
1187-92, with United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 821 (W.D. Va. 2011) . 
 76 United States v. Alvarez, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210). 
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A. The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 & False Statements of Fact: 
An Unconstitutional Restriction on Protected Speech 
A constitutional analysis of the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 
must begin with a threshold determination of whether the 
First Amendment protects the speech the Act seeks to regulate. 
In United States v. Stevens, the Supreme Court reaffirmed a 
list of categories of speech that the First Amendment does not 
protect: “obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech 
integral to criminal conduct.”77 Even though the Court 
acknowledged that this list is not exhaustive,78 the Court is 
generally reluctant to create a new category because it does not 
want to broaden the reach of the government over public 
discourse.79 Thus, in determining whether the speech at issue in 
a government regulation should be afforded an exception to 
First Amendment protection, the Court first tries to fit the 
speech into one of the existing categories.80 If there is no 
recognized classification, then the Court requires the 
government to proffer evidence that the speech has not 
traditionally been protected by the First Amendment—and 
therefore should not be protected today.81 
The Stolen Valor Act concerns “false statement[s] of fact,” 
or lies.82 Surely “there is no unbridled constitutional right to lie.”83 
But mere lies do not fall under the list of traditionally unprotected 
categories,84 nor are they worthy of a newly recognized one. 
Therefore, the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 regulates protected speech 
and is not presumptively constitutional under this analysis. 
1. Failing to Fit Within Unprotected Categories of 
Speech 
False statements of fact are most closely related to 
defamation and fraud, but are insufficiently identifiable with 
either to constitute unprotected speech.85 
  
 77 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (citations omitted). 
 78 Id. at 1586. 
 79 See id. at 1585. 
 80 See id. at 1584. 
 81 See id. at 1585. 
 82 See Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006); United States v. 
Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2010) (analyzing the type of speech at issue as a 
“false statement of fact”), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210). 
 83 Id. at 1205. 
 84 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585-86. 
 85 See id. at 1584 (listing unprotected categories). The Act’s false statements 
of fact would not fall under Stevens’ remaining three categories. To be obscene, the 
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Defamatory speech must inflict harm to another’s 
reputation.86 If the statements concern a “matter of public concern” 
or a public official,87 the plaintiff must show that the statements 
were made with “actual malice.”88 Even though false statements 
can be defamatory, the Stolen Valor Act does not require that false 
statements be made with a specific intent or a resulting harm.89 
Additionally, despite the Act’s regulation of speech that would, in 
effect, “defame” the military, the speech does not constitute 
defamation because the military is a government agency, not an 
individual. Therefore, false statements of fact under the Act do not 
fall within the category of defamation. 
The fraud category is equally inapplicable. The 
prosecution in a case of fraud must prove a bona fide harm; 
fraudulent statements or conduct must “induce another to act 
to his or her detriment.”90 As indicated, prosecution under the 
Stolen Valor Act of 2005 requires no evidence of harm.  
Even when comparing the Act to other types of fraud 
statutes, it still does not fit neatly. For example, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 912, which criminalizes the impersonation of government 
employees or officers,91 attaches when the individual 
“perform[s] . . . acts under the guise of [the] assumed identity”92 
  
speech would have to do with sexuality or sexual desire. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15, 24 (1973) (In determining whether a work is obscene, “the trier of fact must [ask] 
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would 
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”) To constitute incitement, the 
speech would have to “persuad[e] another person to commit a crime.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 347 (3d pocket ed. 2006). To amount to speech integral to criminal 
conduct, the speech must be “intrinsically related” to a crime. See New York v. Ferber, 
458 U.S. 747, 761-62 (1982). 
 86 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 188 (3d pocket ed. 2006). 
 87 Id. 
 88 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964). 
 89 See Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006). While it can be 
argued that injury to the public may be implied if the speaker is a public official, the 
Stolen Valor Act does not specifically address public officials. For a more detailed analysis 
of the harms resulting from false statements made by public officials, see infra Part IV.B. 
 90 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 300 (3d pocket ed. 2006).  
 91 18 U.S.C. § 912 (“Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or 
employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or 
officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains 
any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.”). 
 92 United States v. Harmon, 496 F.2d 20, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1974) (the court 
dismissed an indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1970), using the same “and acts as 
such” language as the current version 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2006), because it did not allege 
that defendant performed any “acts”). 
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in an effort to obtain a benefit to which he is not entitled.93 The 
Stolen Valor Act of 2005 does not require any specific acts in 
furtherance of any motive; it requires the mere utterance of 
words. Additionally, the Act is not comparable to perjury, 
requiring a “willful” false statement made under oath, or even 
criminally fraudulent administrative filings, requiring: (1) 
scienter and (2) the objective to interfere with the proper 
functioning, or the economic interests, of the government or a 
private party.94 
Without these extra elements, the false statements of fact 
criminalized under the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 fail to fall within 
any of the categories of unprotected speech articulated in Stevens. 
2. False Statements of Fact—Their Own Category? 
Even though “false statements” under section 704(b) do 
not fall within any of the currently unprotected categories of 
speech, the Court could recognize false statements of fact as a 
new category.95 But when analyzed in terms of history and 
tradition, false statements of fact do not fall within the type of 
speech that has traditionally remained unprotected by the 
First Amendment and therefore do not constitute their own 
category of unprotected speech. 
In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court 
noted its tolerance of some “erroneous statement[s].”96 
Protection of some false speech is required to preserve the 
“breathing space that [freedoms of expression] need to survive.”97 
In other words, as the Ninth Circuit articulated, “the First 
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to 
protect speech that matters.”98 Therefore, a category of 
unprotected speech for all false statements should not be created. 
Despite this seemingly supported rationale, the Western 
District of Virginia, in United States v. Robbins, relied upon 
  
 93 18 U.S.C. § 912. 
 94 United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993) (involving a prosecution for perjury 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 
11-210); and 18 U.S.C. § 1035 (an example of a federal statute criminalizing falsities 
when trying to obtain health care benefits)).  
 95 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010). 
 96 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (stating that 
“erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate” (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415, 433 (1963))). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1203 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 341 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. to support its conclusion that false 
statements of fact constitute their own category of unprotected 
speech.99 The Court in Gertz described false statements of fact 
as “belong[ing] to that category of utterances . . . of such slight 
social value . . . that any benefit that may be derived from them 
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.”100 However, more recently in Stevens, the Court 
seemed to reject the approach utilized in Gertz, stating that 
“[t]he First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not 
extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc 
balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”101 According to 
the Supreme Court, the language articulated in Gertz was not a 
test to be applied to speech when determining whether it is an 
exception to First Amendment protection; rather, it was 
dictum.102 Even if the “speech is not very important” or lacks 
societal value, the Court seems to say that it cannot be 
influenced by these factors when determining whether 
government regulation has stepped too far.103 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit, in Alvarez, explained that 
while some categorical exclusions do comprise false-statement 
speech, the falsity of speech alone is not enough to take it 
beyond the scope of First Amendment protection.104 Despite 
relying on Supreme Court precedent, Judge Bybee, in his 
dissent, did not appear to fully refute the majority’s assertion.105 
For example, when arguing that false statements of fact fall 
outside of First Amendment protection, Judge Bybee partially 
relied upon Garrison v. Louisiana, which states that “knowingly 
false statement[s] . . . do not enjoy constitutional protection.”106 
Yet the false statement in Garrison was defamatory and 
therefore had to be made with “actual malice.”107 
  
 99 United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 817-18 (W.D. Va. 2011) 
(citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40).  
 100 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 572 (1942)). 
 101 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010). 
 102 Id. at 1585-86. 
 103 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000). 
 104 United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210). 
 105 Id. at 1219 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
64, 75 (1964)). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Compare Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75, with Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1219 (Bybee, 
J., dissenting). 
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Overall, false statements of fact, without more, have 
historically been protected by the First Amendment and should 
not be classified as their own category of unprotected speech.  
B. The Stolen Valor Act of 2005—An Unconstitutional 
Content-Based Restriction 
Since the Stolen Valor Act regulates protected speech, 
the Act is subject to further constitutional analysis.108 In addition 
to the distinction between protected and unprotected speech, the 
Supreme Court has differentiated between content-neutral and 
content-based regulations.109 If the regulation is content-based, 
then the regulation is presumptively invalid; the government 
may rebut this presumption by showing that the law passes 
strict scrutiny,110 “the most demanding test known to 
constitutional law.”111 Under this standard, the Stolen Valor Act 
of 2005 is unconstitutional because it sets forth a content-based 
restriction in section 704(b) and fails to satisfy strict scrutiny. 
1. Content-Based Versus Content-Neutral Restrictions 
on Speech 
Content-based restrictions prohibit or inhibit a type of 
speech based solely on its topic, whereas content-neutral 
restrictions regulate speech in general, regardless of its subject 
matter.112 The Supreme Court has confirmed this distinction in 
a number of cases. In United States v. Stevens, the Supreme 
Court found a statute that prohibited “visual and audio 
depictions” in which “a living animal [was] intentionally harmed” 
to be content-based.113 In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 
the Court also found the City’s regulation content-based where 
the statute prohibited all peaceful picketing next to schools except 
if the picketing related to a “school’s labor-management 
  
 108 Compare Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1217, and United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. 
Supp. 2d 1183, 1187-92 (D. Colo. 2010), with United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 
815, 821 (W.D. Va. 2011). 
 109 See, e.g., Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63 (1970); see also Geoffrey 
R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the Twentieth 
Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 278 (2009). See generally Christopher M. Schultz, Note, 
Content-Based Restrictions on Free Expression: Reevaluating the High Versus Low 
Value Speech Distinction, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 573 (1999). 
 110 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010). 
 111 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997). 
 112 See, e.g., Police Dep’t. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Schact, 398 
U.S. at 63; see also Stone, supra note 109, at 278. 
 113 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584. 
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dispute.”114 The Court in Mosley noted, however, that had the city 
ordinance prohibited all peaceful picketing without exception, the 
statute would have been content-neutral.115 
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 prohibits false statements 
of fact only when the statements misrepresent the individual’s 
receipt of a military award.116 Similar to the statutes at issue in 
Stevens and Mosley, the Act requires the government to look at 
the content of the expression to determine whether the speech 
is prohibited. Therefore, the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 is a 
content-based restriction on speech. 
2. Applying Strict Scrutiny 
As a content-based restriction on protected speech, the 
Act is subject to strict scrutiny. To pass constitutional muster 
under strict scrutiny, the government must prove that the 
statute at issue “serve[s] a compelling state interest and that it 
is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”117 Ultimately, the Stolen 
Valor Act of 2005 fails to satisfy either element of this test. 
a. Government Interest 
In order to pass strict scrutiny, the government first 
bears the burden of showing that the statute is supported by a 
“compelling government interest.”118 A compelling government 
interest is one “of the highest order”119 and very few government 
interests are able to meet this standard.120 If there is no 
“compelling government interest” for the Stolen Valor Act of 
2005, the Act will not pass constitutional muster.121 Even 
though the government may conceivably present a few 
purposes that support the Act, none is compelling.  
The primary purpose of the Act is to protect the “sacrifice, 
history, reputation, honor and meaning associated with military 
  
 114 Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95. 
 115 See id. 
 116 See 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006). 
 117 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry 
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1982)). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
 120 See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 492 U.S. 
115, 130 (1989) (holding the protection of the physical and psychological well-being of 
minors is a compelling government interest supporting the regulation of obscene 
telephone calls); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (holding national security as a 
compelling government interest). 
 121 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. 
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medals and decorations.”122 The Act is also meant to incentivize 
acts of meritorious bravery.123 In other words, if anyone can claim 
that he or she has a military award, the incentive value of the 
award diminishes.124 While the Ninth Circuit and the District of 
Colorado recognized that these are important government 
interests,125 they are not compelling. Due to congressional 
authority to “raise and support armies,” courts generally give 
more deference to regulations with military purposes, especially 
when those purposes are “unrelated to the suppression of 
speech.”126 However, as the District of Colorado noted, there is no 
precedent that the Act’s interests are compelling.127  
National security is the closest recognized compelling 
interest because incentivizing acts of valor and maintaining the 
reputation of the military strengthens the nation’s defense.128 
Nevertheless, the absence of the Act’s protection would not 
create disarray or malfunction great enough to threaten 
national security. The Act simply seeks to protect a rewards 
system, albeit a very important and honorable system, but not 
something that upholds the security of the nation.129 
Additionally, precedent suggests that the putative interests 
behind the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 are not compelling. In 
Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court struck down a statute 
that criminalized flag burning because the interest put forward 
by the government, “preserving the flag as a symbol of national 
unity,” was insufficiently compelling.130 According to the 
Supreme Court, “To conclude that the government may permit 
designated symbols to be used to communicate only a limited 
  
 122 United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1189 (D. Colo. 2010).  
 123 Id. at 1190. 
 124 Id. 
 125 United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210); see Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 
2d at 1189-91. 
 126 See United States v. Perelman, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1238 (D. Nev. 2010) 
(citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)); Log Cabin Republicans v. 
United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 926-27 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 127 Order for Supplemental Briefing, United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 
2d 1183 (D. Colo. 2010) (No. 09-cr-00497-REB), 2009 WL 5126540, at *2. 
 128 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (holding national security as a 
compelling government interest). 
 129 For a description of the United States’ awards system and a description of the 
evolution of heraldry, see Ribbons—Order of Precedence, INSTITUTE OF HERALDRY, 
http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/Awards/order_of_precedence.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 
2011); What Is Heraldry, INSTITUTE OF HERALDRY, http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/ 
Heraldry /heraldry.aspx.  
 130 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989). 
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set of messages would be to enter a territory having no 
discernible or defensible boundaries.”131  
Furthermore, the judiciary treats the secondary interest 
regarding incentives with equal, if not more, disfavor. Both the 
District of Colorado and the Ninth Circuit were skeptical that a 
soldier’s act of valor is solely motivated by a medal.132 After all, 
soldiers performed acts of bravery well before the existence of 
military awards.133 By arguing that military decorations 
incentivize valor, the government in fact diminishes the value 
of the valorous acts it claims to protect.134  
Though not all courts have addressed whether the 
government’s interests in issuing awards of commendation are 
compelling, not a single court has held that they are. While the 
Ninth Circuit avoided a clear holding on this issue, the District 
Court of Colorado clearly indicated that the government 
interests are not compelling.135 In conclusion, the Stolen Valor 
Act of 2005 does not serve any “compelling government 
interest” and therefore fails the first prong of strict scrutiny. 
b. Narrow Tailoring 
Even if a court finds an asserted government interest 
compelling, the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 would still fail strict 
scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored.136 In order to meet 
this standard, the Act must utilize the “least restrictive means” 
to further the government interest.137 The Stolen Valor Act of 
2005 fails to meet this standard due to the vast number of 
alternative, less restrictive measures the government could 
have implemented in lieu of the Act. 
For example, in Alvarez, the Ninth Circuit suggested that 
if the Act were restructured to include elements of mens rea and 
injury, it may pass constitutional muster.138 In fact, if the Act were 
amended to attach only when another individual’s reliance on 
falsities were to his or her detriment, the Act would more closely 
resemble a fraud statute (a category of unprotected speech).139  
  
 131 Id. at 417. 
 132 United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210); Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1190-91. 
 133 GENERAL ORDERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 41, at 30-31. 
 134 Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1190-91. 
 135 Id.; Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1216. 
 136 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). 
 137 Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 130 (1989). 
 138 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1209-11. 
 139 See supra Part II.A.1. 
242 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1 
Aside from amending the Act, the court also suggested 
that there may be no need for a criminal statute at all.140 As 
declared by the Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson, “If there 
be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and 
fallacies, to overt the evil by the processes of education, the 
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”141 
Since the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 punishes the statements 
solely because they are false, more speech that unveils the 
falsehood could be sufficient to deter the lies. In turn, law 
enforcement would not need to waste its time prosecuting. 
The Ninth Circuit also suggested that the following 
were less restrictive means to achieve the government’s goals: 
“publicizing the names of legitimate recipients or false 
claimants, creating an educational program, [or] prohibiting 
the act of posing as a veteran to obtain certain benefits.”142 
Altogether, the government could have used less 
restrictive means that would not have burdened individuals’ 
First Amendment rights. Although not all courts have analyzed 
the tailoring of the Act, the Ninth Circuit’s suggestions appear 
reasonably valid.143 Overall, the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 fails 
both prongs of strict scrutiny and is therefore unconstitutional. 
C. The Stolen Valor Act of 2005—Unconstitutionally 
Overbroad and Void-for-Vagueness 
Even though the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 should be 
struck down as a content-based restriction of constitutionally 
protected speech, the Act may also fail scrutiny under the 
overbreadth and void-for-vagueness doctrines.144 Under both of 
these doctrines, the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 is unconstitutional. 
1. Overbreadth Doctrine 
The First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine may be 
used to facially challenge a statute if the statute is either a 
content-neutral or a content-based restriction on protected 
speech or if it regulates unprotected speech.145 According to the 
  
 140 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1216. 
 141 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (quoting Whitney v. California, 
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
 142 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1210. 
 143 Id. at 1217. 
 144 See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 494-504 (1982); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-22 (1972). 
 145 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). 
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Supreme Court, “the party challenging the law must 
demonstrate not just from the text of the statute, but also from 
actual fact that a substantial number of instances exist in 
which the law cannot be applied constitutionally.”146 If the facial 
challenge is successful, “the prosecution fails regardless of the 
nature of the defendant’s own conduct, because [it] renders a 
statute unconstitutional and invalid in all its applications.”147 
Because an overbreadth challenge will render an entire statute 
invalid even if the statute has no unconstitutional effect as 
applied, the Court is generally reluctant to strike down 
legislation under this doctrine.148 Despite this reluctance, the 
Stolen Valor Act of 2005 may be struck down as facially 
overbroad. 
As recognized by the dissent in Alvarez, penned by 
Judge Bybee, there are at least two ways section 704(b) may be 
overbroad.149 First, Judge Bybee conceded that the Act may 
reach “inadvertent violations of the act” due to the lack of a 
scienter requirement.150 Second, the Act gives no exception for 
“satire or imaginative expression,” both historically protected 
speech.151 Whether these mistaken and theatrical statements 
are substantial enough to create a realistic threat is a difficult 
question to answer.152 However, it appears that the Act under 
these circumstances would cut into private conversations and 
chill speech historically protected by the First Amendment.153 
To determine whether either of these examples of 
overreaching is sufficient to support an overbreadth challenge, 
the first step is to ask “whether the Stolen Valor Act actually 
covers” mistaken or theatrical statements.154 When interpreting 
statutes under this doctrine, courts do “not lightly assume that 
Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected 
liberties” and therefore look for a “limiting construction” that 
  
 146 N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988). 
 147 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1236 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (quoting Wurtz v. Risley, 
719 F.2d 1438, 1440 (9th Cir. 1983); Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 
469, 483 (1989)). 
 148 United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613). 
 149 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1236 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
 150 Id. at 1236-37. 
 151 Id. at 1222. 
 152 See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988). 
 153 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52, 57 (1988) (holding that 
liability for publishing an ad parody is inconsistent with the First Amendment); Greenbelt 
Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (holding that liability for publishing 
rhetorical hyperbole “would subvert the most fundamental meaning of a free press”). 
 154 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1237 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
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could avoid overbreadth.155 Judge Bybee, in his Alvarez dissent, 
and Judge Jones, in United States v. Robbins, used two 
different approaches to limit the Stolen Valor Act’s 
construction.156 Neither of the constructions seems sufficient to 
overcome an overbreadth challenge. 
In Robbins, Judge Jones of the Western District of 
Virginia asserted that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 should be 
read to only address “knowingly false statements” where “the 
defendant intended to deceive.”157 Judge Jones concluded that 
this limiting construction would not suppress ambiguous, 
mistaken, or misunderstood statements, nor punish “false 
statement in fictions, in parody, or as rhetorical hyperbole;” 
“only outright lies, not ideas, [would be] punishable.”158  
While this approach does limit the Act to avoid 
overbreadth, the construction also seems to be impermissible. 
Perhaps interpreting the statute to include a “knowing” 
element would be permissible, but assuming an “intent to 
deceive” does not seem appropriate when no actual words in 
the statute support that notion. In support of the specific 
intent, Judge Jones cited two cases.159 Each case involved facial 
challenges against a statute criminalizing false representations 
of United States citizenship.160 In the first case, the Ninth 
Circuit in United States v. Esparza-Ponce considered statutory 
language “mak[ing] it a crime for anyone to knowingly and 
falsely represent himself to be a citizen of the United States 
without regard” to whom the statement was made. The statute 
should be read, the Court held, to require proof that “the 
person to whom [the] false statement was made had good 
reason to inquire into the nationality status.”161 In the second 
case, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Achtner that 
“representation of citizenship must still be made to a person 
having some right to inquire or adequate reason for 
  
 155 United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 818 (W.D. Va. 2011) 
(quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 
485 U.S. 568 (1988)). 
 156 Compare Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1237-41 (Bybee, J., dissenting), with 
Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 818-19. 
 157 Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 819. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. (citing United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (9th 
Cir. 1999); United States v. Achtner, 144 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1944)). 
 160 Id. 
 161 Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d at 1137 (quoting Smiley v. United States, 181 
F.2d 505, 507-08 (9th Cir. 1950)). 
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ascertaining a defendant’s citizenship.”162 In both of these cases, 
the courts pointed out that the limiting construction they 
applied to the statute already existed prior to the facial 
challenges brought before them.163 Using the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Reno v. ACLU, the Ninth Circuit noted that even 
though courts may impose limiting constructions if there is not 
one already in place, to impose a new one, the statute must be 
“readily susceptible to th[e] construction.”164 
No court had implemented a limiting construction of the 
Stolen Valor Act of 2005 prior to Judge Jones’s attempt in 
Robbins.165 Further, section 704(b) does not appear to be 
“readily susceptible” to the limiting construction Judge Jones 
sought to employ. To begin with, neither of the cases Judge 
Jones cited limits the construction of the statute to include a 
specific intent of the perpetrator.166 Additionally, no words or 
phrases in the statute imply that Congress meant to require 
the specific intent to deceive.167 
In ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, the Northern District of 
Georgia rejected the government’s suggestion to engraft onto a 
statute the specific intent to deceive or defraud.168 The statute 
made it a crime for 
any person . . . knowingly to transmit any data through a computer 
network . . . for the purpose of setting up, maintaining, operating, or 
exchanging data with an electronic mailbox, home page, or any other 
electronic information storage bank or point of access to electronic 
information if such data uses any individual name . . . to falsely 
identify the person . . . .169 
The district court noted that “[b]y its plain language the 
criminal prohibition applies regardless of whether a speaker has 
any intent to deceive or whether deception actually occurs.”170 
Additionally, the phrases intent to deceive and intent to defraud 
appear nowhere in the language of the statute, despite the 
“express[] inclu[sion] [of such phrases] in other Georgia criminal 
  
 162 Achtner, 144 F.2d at 52. 
 163 Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d at 1137; Achtner, 144 F.2d at 52. 
 164 Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d at 1138 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997)). 
 165 See United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 818-19 (W.D. Va. 2011) 
(applying a new limiting construction and noting that the statute must be readily 
susceptible to it, implying that the limiting construction had not yet been employed). 
 166 See Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d at 1137-38; Achtner, 144 F.2d at 52. 
 167 See Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006). 
 168 ACLU of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1232-33 (N.D. Ga. 1997). 
 169 Id. at 1230. 
 170 Id. at 1232. 
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statutes which require proof of specific intent.”171 Moreover, the 
district court asserted that although the word falsely does 
appear in the statute, it is not synonymous with intent to deceive 
or intent to defraud.172 “‘Falsely’ means merely ‘wrongly,’ 
‘incorrectly,’ or ‘not truthfully.’”173 
Here, the plain language of the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 
applies “regardless of whether a speaker has any intent to 
deceive.”174 The Act omits the phrases intent to deceive and intent 
to defraud—phrases that Congress expressly uses in other 
federal criminal statutes.175 Furthermore, while the Act uses the 
word falsely, the Act cannot be construed to require a specific 
intent based on the use of this word because falsely is by no 
means synonymous with an intent to deceive.176 Thus, the Stolen 
Valor Act of 2005 does not appear to be “readily susceptible” to 
Judge Jones’s limiting construction requiring a specific intent.  
In Alvarez, Judge Bybee applied a different limiting 
construction. But the construction is still insufficient to satisfy 
the overbreadth doctrine. Judge Bybee based his limiting 
construction upon the interpretation of the word represents in 
the Act, calling upon Webster’s Dictionary’s “first definition of 
the word . . . ‘[t]o bring clearly before the mind: [to] cause to be 
known . . . [to] present esp. by description.’”177 With this 
definition in mind, Judge Bybee asserted that “an ambiguous 
statement that could conceivably be misinterpreted to claim 
receipt of a military award could not be punished under the Act 
because such a statement would not ‘bring clearly before the 
mind’ of the listener that the speaker has described himself as 
having won the award.”178 He also argued that the Act would 
not apply under his construction to “satirical or theatrical 
  
 171 Id.  
 172 Id. at 1232 n.4. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 1232. 
 175 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006) (“Whoever, having devised or intending to 
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be 
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than 20 years, or both.” (emphasis added)). 
 176 Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1232 n.4. 
 177 United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1238 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bybee, J., 
dissenting) (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1926 (2002)), 
cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210). 
 178 Id. 
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statements claiming receipt of a military award” because any 
such statements would be “entirely untrue.”179 
Concededly, Judge Bybee’s limiting construction is 
compelling; it could easily be implemented to restrict the reach 
of the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. However, Judge Bybee seemed 
to focus on a very narrow portion of the meaning of represent 
and creates a misimpression as to how effective this limiting 
construction would be. For example, Webster’s Dictionary also 
indicates that represent is defined as “to serve as a sign or 
symbol of,” “to portray or exhibit in art,” “to serve as the 
counterpart image of,” “to produce on the stage,” “to act the 
part or role of,” and “to describe as having a specified character 
or quality.”180 Additionally, while Webster’s Dictionary’s first 
definition is “to bring clearly before the mind,” Oxford 
Dictionaries lists first, to “be entitled or appointed to act or 
speak for (someone), especially in an official capacity.”181 That 
first definition is followed by “constitute; amount to” and “depict 
(a particular subject) in a picture or other work of art.”182 In the 
legal context, the Federal Circuit has found the definition of 
represent to include, “to be an accredited deputy or substitute for 
(a number of persons) in a legislative or deliberative assembly,” 
“to describe as having a specified character or quality; to give out 
assert or declare to be of a certain kind,” and “to symbolize, to 
serve as a visible or concrete embodiment.”183 With this fuller 
understanding of the meaning of represent, the possibility that 
the Act would still impermissibly punish works of satire, fiction, 
and parody seems markedly clear.  
In addition, the Act would still apply to mistaken 
remarks regarding receipt of military awards because the 
definition Judge Bybee relies upon focuses on the point of view of 
the listener, not the speaker. An individual prosecuted under the 
Act need not even realize that he or she created a misimpression, 
  
 179 Id. at 1240-41. 
 180 Represent Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/represent?show=0&t=1309095986 (last visited July 10, 2011). 
 181 Represent Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/ 
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 183 McEntee v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 404 F.3d 1320, 1333-34 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 657-58 (2d ed. 1989)) (determining under the 
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but the statement he or she made still may have “br[ought] [that 
misimpression] clearly before the mind” of the listener.184 
Overall, the two limiting constructions offered by Judge 
Bybee and Judge Jones do not appear to prevent the Act’s 
application to mistaken or theatrical statements. Even though 
it is difficult to determine whether these applications of the Act 
are substantial enough, it appears that no reasonable limiting 
construction would be able to refute a facial challenge of the 
overbreadth of the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Although no court 
has so held, the Act is facially invalid under the First 
Amendment because it is overbroad. 
2. Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine 
In general, when the Court applies the overbreadth 
doctrine, it also analyzes the regulation in terms of void-for-
vagueness.185 Under this analysis, a law must “state explicitly 
and definitely what acts are prohibited, so as to provide fair 
warning and preclude arbitrary enforcement.”186 The Supreme 
Court has asserted that the more important element of the two 
is the principle regarding enforcement guidelines proffered by 
the legislature.187 “Where the legislature fails to provide such 
minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit ‘a 
standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and 
juries to pursue their personal predilections.’”188 
In his overbreadth analysis of the Act, Judge Bybee 
contended that the term represents guides law enforcement in 
restricting the sweep of the statute.189 However, reliance upon law 
enforcement’s interpretation of a word (especially a word that is 
defined in a plethora of ways) does not completely prevent 
arbitrary enforcement. Thus, in light of the way the Stolen Valor 
Act of 2005 is written, there is nothing to stop its arbitrary 
enforcement without “explicit[]” or “definite[]” guidelines.  
  
 184 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1238 (Bybee, J., dissenting). Perhaps if this limiting 
construction were combined with a requirement that the individual knowingly make 
the false statements, then the Act would pass constitutional muster under the 
overbreadth doctrine. However, while knowingly may be a construction the Act is 
readily susceptible to, Congress has expressly included a knowledge requirement in 
other statutes when it intended for knowledge to be an element of the crime.  
 185 See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 494-504 (1982); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-14 (1972). 
 186 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 754 (3d pocket ed. 2006). 
 187 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983). 
 188 Id. (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)). 
 189 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1237-38 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
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Furthermore, the Act does not provide citizens “actual 
notice” of what statements are truly punishable within the 
ambiguities of the word represents.190 Because of this lack of 
notice, the Act has the ability to “chill” speech in contravention 
of First Amendment purposes. Only Judge Bybee, in his 
dissent, has analyzed the Act under the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine. Despite this, it seems apparent that the Act is void-
for-vagueness and unconstitutional. 
III. CONGRESS’S IMPERFECT PROPOSAL—THE STOLEN VALOR 
ACT OF 2011 
Although the foregoing constitutional analyses provide a 
basis to strike down the Stolen Valor Act of 2005,191 in an 
attempt to fix the flaws in section 704(b), Congress proposed a 
new statute entitled the Stolen Valor Act of 2011.192 While the 
proposed bill provides a better means to police speech that 
steals valor, Congress has not addressed all of the flaws the 
courts have raised and may still be unable to receive a 
constitutional consensus among the courts. 
A. The Stolen Valor Act of 2011 Would Still Regulate 
Protected Speech 
Even though Congress attempted to distinguish the 
proposed bill from section 704(b) by criminalizing 
“misrepresentations” rather than “false claims,”193 
“misrepresentations” like “mere lies” or “false statements of 
fact” would likely not be deemed to hold their own category of 
unprotected speech under Stevens.194 The “misrepresentations” 
in the proposed bill, however, do not completely stand alone; 
the bill requires specific “intent to obtain anything of value.”195 
While this added element may aid in avoiding First 
Amendment scrutiny, intent alone would likely not be 
sufficient without a requisite harm. 
In his amicus curiae brief in United States v. Strandlof, 
Eugene Volokh argued that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, if 
  
 190 See Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006). 
 191 See supra Part II. 
 192 See Stolen Valor Act of 2011, H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). 
 193 Compare Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), with H.R. 1775. 
 194 See supra Part II.A. 
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construed to require knowing false statements, is constitutional. 
Professor Volokh asserted that  
[p]eople who lie about decorations generally do so for a reason: They 
may want to get elected to public office, or to get more credibility for 
their own statements in another’s election campaign, or to get more 
credibility in some nonelectoral political debate, or even just to get 
more respect from neighbors, acquaintances, and potential business 
associates. They are thus trying to manipulate people’s behavior 
through falsehood, and their false claims are quite likely to indeed 
affect others’ behavior (especially since having a military decoration 
is often seen as an especially important mark of good character).196 
Professor Volokh suggests that manipulating “private 
citizens’ behavior through falsehoods is a significant enough 
harm” on its own.197 Therefore, there is no need to eliminate an 
express harm or injury requirement in the statute.198 While 
Professor Volokh’s argument is consistent with the perceived 
unsavory nature of these misrepresentations, in striking the 
law down, the Ninth Circuit and the District Court of Colorado 
both found it persuasive that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 does 
not require harm to be proven.199 
This contradiction may be due to Clay Calvert and 
Rebekah Rich’s suggestion that, after Stevens, the courts have 
shifted their constitutional analysis under the First 
Amendment from a more “value-based methodology”—which 
examines the societal value of the speech at issue and only 
protects speech that matters—to a “causation-of-harm-based 
methodology,” which focuses upon “the direct nexus (if any) 
between that speech and the alleged harms to humans that it 
causes.”200 
This understanding of Stevens cuts against an argument 
that the misrepresentations contemplated by the Act should be 
given their own category of unprotected speech without a 
requisite harm. Further, there is no historical evidence that 
misrepresentations with specific intent but without requisite 
harm have been unprotected by the First Amendment.201 The 
  
 196 Eugene Volokh, Amicus Curiae Brief: Boundaries of the First Amendment’s 
“False Statements of Fact” Exception, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 343, 353-54 (2010). 
 197 Id. at 354. 
 198 See id. 
 199 See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 
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courts’ recent shift to a “causation-of-harm-based methodology”202 
coupled with the reluctance of lower courts to carve out new 
categories of unprotected speech203 suggest that courts will not find 
that the Stolen Valor Act of 2011 regulates unprotected speech.  
B. The Proposed Bill Would Still Be a Content-Based 
Restriction Subject to Strict Scrutiny 
In addition to regulating protected speech, just as section 
704(b) was a content-based restriction,204 the proposed legislation, 
which regulates misrepresentations regarding one’s military 
service, would also be a content-based restriction. Therefore, the 
proposed bill would likely be subject to strict scrutiny.205 
The government’s purported interest behind the Stolen 
Valor Act of 2011 would likely go further than the Stolen Valor 
Act of 2005. Potentially, the government could argue that the 
proposed bill protects not just the reputation of the awards but 
the reputation of the entire military. This expanded government 
interest may be found compelling under a strict scrutiny 
analysis, despite a lack of precedent. First, the interest does not 
run afoul of Texas v. Johnson, which took issue with “preserving 
the flag as a symbol of national unity,”206 because “symbols” such 
as the military awards and decorations of section 704(b) are not 
the only content regulated by the proposed legislation. 
Additionally, because the government interest is a broader 
military purpose, it may receive the deference that courts 
generally give to military purposes in line with the congressional 
authority to “raise and support armies.”207 
Despite the seemingly compelling nature of this 
government interest, preserving the reputation of the military, 
a government entity, presents a conflict with a traditional First 
Amendment policy of preventing statutes providing for 
“government . . . self-preservation.”208 As Geoffrey Stone 
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 204 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 205 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010). 
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contends, in striking down self-preserving laws, the Court not 
only wishes to prevent legislators from using “the power of 
government to intimidat[e] [and] silence its critics,” but the 
Court also does not want the government “to dominate and 
manipulate public debate.”209 The government may breach this 
principle outwardly,210 or it may do so pretextually, that is, by 
stating a permissible purpose while trying, in fact, to suppress 
opposition.211 Either way, the Court has illustrated that such 
regulations are unconstitutional.212 
For example, in Schact v. United States, the Court 
struck down a law that prohibited actors from wearing 
accurate military uniforms in theatrical productions that 
negatively portrayed the military.213 This law was not only an 
attempt to censor critics of the Vietnam War, but was also an 
attempt to dominate the public arena with only positive 
associations between soldiers and the war.214 
While the statute in Schact seemed to be enacted with 
the express purpose to preserve the government, the Stolen 
Valor Act of 2011 would not seem to have the same purpose.215 
The proposed legislation is a response to inconsistent court 
rulings regarding the Stolen Valor Act of 2005’s 
constitutionality.216 Further, the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 was a 
response to the increased crime perpetuated by the false 
representations.217 Moreover, unlike the statute in Schact,218 the 
misrepresentations of the Stolen Valor Act of 2011 do not depict 
the military in a negative light.219 Thus, the bill does not aid in 
“silencing [government] critics,” nor does it “manipulate public 
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debate.”220 Even though the Stolen Valor Act of 2011 could be 
perceived, as a matter of policy, as an impermissible regulation, 
policing misrepresentations regarding one’s military service does 
not seem to amount to actual government self-preservation. 
Even if the Court deems the government’s interest 
compelling, the bill would still be subject to a narrow tailoring 
analysis under strict scrutiny. With the specific intent 
requirement, the proposed legislation is a less restrictive 
measure than the currently enacted section 704(b). However, 
without requisite harm the legislation does not seem to provide 
the “least restrictive means” to achieve the compelling 
government interest at stake.  
As already indicated, Calvert and Rich suggest that 
harm caused by speech is now the central focus of First 
Amendment analysis.221 Even though Volokh would likely 
suggest that misrepresentations themselves produce a 
significant enough harm to pass constitutional muster,222 under 
a strict scrutiny analysis it is unlikely that a court invoking the 
“causation-of-harm-based methodology” would uphold the 
proposed legislation without a more express harm indicated in 
the statute.223 Therefore, the Stolen Valor Act of 2011 would 
likely be held unconstitutional under strict scrutiny and would 
not completely resolve the conflicts between the Stolen Valor 
Act of 2005 and the First Amendment.  
C. The Stolen Valor Act of 2011 Would Not Be Overbroad or 
Void-for-Vagueness 
In the event that the Stolen Valor Act of 2011 is deemed 
a regulation of unprotected speech, the Act would be subject to 
the overbreadth and void-for-vagueness doctrines instead of 
strict scrutiny.224 Under these two analyses, however, the Court 
would likely hold the proposed legislation constitutional, unlike 
the currently enacted section 704(b). 
The proposed legislation not only requires that the 
misrepresentations be made knowingly but also that the 
misrepresentations be made with the specific intent to obtain 
  
 220 Stone, supra note 109, at 277. 
 221 Calvert & Rich, supra note 50, at 4. 
 222 See Volokh, supra note 196, at 353. 
 223 Calvert & Rich, supra note 50, at 4. 
 224 See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 494-504 (1982); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-21 (1972). 
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anything of value.225 In interpreting the Stolen Valor Act of 
2011, a limiting construction would not be necessary because 
the specific intent already restricts the reach of the proposed 
legislation to reduce its scope. The proposed act does not 
regulate speech in a manner that is overbroad like the Stolen 
Valor Act of 2005.226 Thus, the proposed legislation would not be 
unconstitutionally overbroad. 
Similarly, with the addition of the specific intent 
requirement, more specific guidelines would be in place to 
prevent law enforcement from “pursu[ing] their personal 
predilections” and arbitrarily enforcing the criminal statute.227 
Therefore, the proposed legislation would pass constitutional 
muster under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 
IV. SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE MEASURES TO COMBAT 
SPEECH THAT STEALS VALOR 
In proposing the new legislation, Congress recognized the 
value in policing speech that steals valor and the need for 
reconstructing the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 to avoid running 
afoul of the First Amendment.228 However, Congress’s proposed 
legislation does not appear to sufficiently amend the Act to pass 
constitutional muster. This note suggests two measures that will 
better police speech that steals valor. First, Congress should 
redraft the proposed legislation to resemble a fraud statute. 
Second, state and local legislatures should impose an eligibility 
requirement for individuals seeking to run for public office. 
A. Fraudulent Misrepresentations of Military Content—A 
Better Resolution 
To transform the Stolen Valor Act of 2011 into a fraud 
statute, Congress would need to add a harm element to the 
statute.229 Calvert and Rich suggest that Congress should draft a 
fraud statute that includes a “monetary harm” requirement.230 But 
the statute may be more effective if it were to include a less specific 
form of harm (such as obtaining a benefit that the perpetrator is 
  
 225 Stolen Valor Act of 2011, H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). 
 226 See supra Part II.C.1. 
 227 See supra Part II.C.2. 
 228 See H.R. 1775, § 2. 
 229 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 300 (3d pocket ed. 2006). 
 230 Calvert & Rich, supra note 50, at 34. 
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not entitled to).231 While a monetary harm may provide stricter 
guidelines for law enforcement to follow, as Volokh points out, 
these military lies are made for a variety of purposes, not just for 
money.232 Additionally, Congress should eliminate the specific 
intent it has imposed in the 2011 Act and only cover knowing 
misrepresentations.233 The fraud statute would also be able to 
invoke the Stolen Valor Act of 2011’s broader application to not just 
false representations about receiving military awards, but also 
misrepresentations about one’s military service.234 
By restructuring the statute to resemble fraud, Congress 
would be able to regulate unprotected speech and would only be 
subject to the overbreadth and void-for-vagueness doctrines, not 
strict scrutiny.235 Requiring knowledge and harm would aid in 
satisfying these doctrines because the statute would not punish 
inadvertent or mistaken misrepresentations—or satirical or 
imaginative expression.236 The special fraud statute would also 
avoid granting law enforcement too much discretion, which 
would lead to arbitrary enforcement.237 
There are a few conceivable objections to creating a 
special fraud statute, but they do not appear to be compelling. 
First, some may argue that criminal sanctions are ineffective or 
too harsh.238 As already indicated, in Texas v. Johnson, the 
Supreme Court asserted that “[i]f there be time to expose 
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to overt the evil 
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more 
speech, not enforced silence.”239 However, “more speech” is 
evidently an insufficient deterrent due to the increased 
incidence relating to these misrepresentations.240 
Second, implementing a special fraud statute may be 
moot because there are already general fraud statutes in 
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place.241 A separate and distinct fraud statute addressing 
misrepresentations of military content would, however, ensure 
that the problems arising from such statements would without 
question be addressed.242 Moreover, Congress can impose an 
enhanced punishment for committing this specialized 
fraudulent act. In turn, prosecutors can not only charge a 
separate count on an indictment (and perhaps an extra 
conviction), but also incur greater deterrence. Furthermore, a 
fraud statute would be more effective than relying upon 
existing impersonation statutes. That is, fraud does not require 
the same requisite degree of conduct in furtherance of the 
misrepresentations.243 
Third, as a matter of policy, some may argue that this 
specialized fraud statute is inconsistent with First Amendment 
principles. The Supreme Court has specifically tried to reveal 
and quash government interference with speech that attempts 
government self-preservation, government suppression of the 
democratic “marketplace of ideas,” and government repression 
of speech in times of crisis.244 In terms of government self-
preservation, the Court is mainly concerned with legislators 
using “the . . . power of government to intimidat[e] [and] silence 
its critics.”245 Here, the purpose behind the specialized fraud 
statute is concededly to protect the reputation of the military, a 
government entity. However, the misrepresentations at issue 
do not portray or criticize the military in a negative light but 
rather serve as a tool to use military stature to one’s benefit.246 
As for suppression of the “marketplace of ideas,” the Court 
seeks to uphold the people’s democratic self-governance by 
maintaining a free and open public forum for speech.247 When 
the government seeks to restrict speech that “convey[s] a 
political message, . . . a matter of public concern, or . . . a view 
point or opinion” regardless of any political underpinnings, the 
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Court seeks to protect it.248 While misrepresentations about 
one’s military service could conceivably be considered a “matter 
of public concern,” a special fraud statute would not chill or 
discourage speech because of the statutory limitations upon the 
punishable speech. Perhaps the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 chills 
speech because it reaches a broader range of lies including 
mistaken or satirical false statements,249 but the special fraud 
statute would not. An additional type of regulation the Court 
generally tries to prevent as a matter of policy arises “in times of 
crisis, real or imagined, [because] citizens and government 
officials tend to panic, to grow desperately intolerant, and to rush 
headlong to suppress speech they can demonize as dangerous, 
subversive, disloyal, or unpatriotic.”250 This type of government 
regulation was present, for example, during World War I, when 
states attempted to promote national unity in response to 
xenophobic panic.251 While the special fraud statute would be 
enacted partly in response to the increased amount of incidence 
relating to false statements of military commendation,252 the 
statute would not be the type of poorly thought-out and excessive 
regulation the Court has sought to strike down.253 State and 
federal legislatures respond to increases in crime rates all the 
time. Thus, increased crime rates do not always constitute the 
type of crisis regulations the Supreme Court seeks to prevent.254 
Therefore, restructuring the proposed legislation to 
resemble a fraud statute is a less restrictive and a more likely 
constitutional alternative to the existing Act. Further, a fraud 
statute would still be an effective means of meeting the 
government interests at stake. 
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B. Holding Public Officials Accountable 
In addition to drafting a specific fraud statute, this note 
calls upon state and local legislatures to enhance eligibility 
requirements for individuals seeking to serve as elected 
officials. Public officials, such as Blumenthal and Kirk, have 
used their military status to further their political goals even 
when that status, in reality, is not what they made it out to 
be.255 Despite the exposure of their lies, these individuals are 
still being elected into office,256 which seems unsavory. After all, 
these individuals are seeking a position of power in a 
government while at the same time diminishing the honor of 
the military that serves to protect it.  
The Constitution currently sets forth the minimum 
requirements to run for an elected position in the federal 
government.257 The Constitution requires of candidates a 
minimum age, a minimum time of citizenship, and legal 
residence within the area for which the candidate seeks to 
serve.258 In addition to these bare essentials, each state has 
general eligibility requirements for federal, state, and local level 
positions.259 For example, some states require that a candidate 
not be a convicted felon.260 In light of the recent political 
scandals, this note suggests that state and local legislatures 
should impose an additional eligibility requirement that 
individuals not misrepresent their military service. For example, 
the eligibility requirement could provide the following:  
No person shall qualify as a candidate for elective public office or 
maintain a public office if already elected in the state of XX who has 
knowingly made misrepresentations regarding his or her military 
service during the course of any campaign for nomination or election 
to public office, by means of campaign materials, including an 
advertisement on radio, television, or the Internet, or in a newspaper 
or periodical, a public speech, or press release, with the intent to 
promote the election of that person. 
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This eligibility requirement is similar to a criminal 
statute upheld by the Ohio Court of Appeals in State v. Davis: 
(B) No person, during the course of any campaign for nomination or 
election to public office or office of a political party, by means of 
campaign materials, including sample ballots, an advertisement on 
radio or television or in a newspaper or periodical, a public speech, 
press release, or otherwise, shall purposely do any of the following: 
  . . . . 
(10) post, publish, circulate, or distribute a written or 
printed false statement, either knowing the same to be false 
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not, 
concerning a candidate that is designed to promote the 
election, nomination, or defeat of the candidate.261 
In Davis, the court examined this criminal sanction 
under strict scrutiny and found that the state had a compelling 
interest “to promote honesty in the election of public officers.”262 
According to the court, “[f]reedom of speech does not include a 
right to purposely, with knowledge of its falsity, publish a false 
statement about a candidate for public office with the intent to 
promote the election or defeat of such candidate.”263 The court 
also found the criminal statute narrowly tailored because it 
“expressly limits a conviction to cases where there is proof that 
the statements were known to be false or were made in 
reckless disregard of their falsity.”264 
Despite this supportive precedent, holding public 
officials accountable for these misstatements, concededly, 
would be difficult. Other cases do not uphold a state’s interest 
in criminalizing false political campaign speech. In fact, one 
court found that “[t]he constitutional guarantee of free speech 
has its ‘fullest and most urgent application in political 
campaigns.’”265 For example, in Brown v. Hartlage, the Supreme 
Court struck down a criminal statute that sanctioned an 
elected official’s unfulfilled and false campaign promises.266 
Even though the Court found that the State had legitimate 
interests in ensuring “that its governing political institutions 
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and officials properly discharge public responsibilities and 
maintain public trust . . . [and] in upholding the integrity of the 
electoral process itself,” the Court did not find the interest to be 
compelling.267 Additionally, in Washington ex. rel. Public 
Disclosure Commission v. 119 Vote No! Committee, the 
Washington Supreme Court analyzed a criminal statute that 
sanctioned political candidates who “sponsor[ed] with actual 
malice . . . [p]olitical advertising that contain[ed] a false 
statement of material fact.”268 This statute was similar to the 
statute at issue in Garrison v. Louisiana, which penalized 
statements criticizing a public official’s conduct when made with 
actual malice.269 In both cases the statutes were struck down.270 In 
Vote No!, the court vigorously argued against the criminalization 
of false campaign speech, asserting that “[i]n political campaigns 
the grossest misstatements, deceptions, and defamations are 
immune from legal sanction unless they violate private rights—
that is, unless individuals are defamed.”271 In addition to adverse 
precedent, Congress has exempted false political campaign 
advertisements from the Federal Trade Commission sanctions 
upon other types of false advertising.272 Moreover, numerous 
scholars suggest that sanctioning false campaign speech would be 
an ineffective method because it would fuel voter alienation; 
afford yet another avenue for one candidate to attack her 
opponent; and lead to extensive litigation, civil or criminal, that 
would continue long after the election is over.273  
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However, the courts, Congress, and scholars have 
generally addressed false campaign speech that one candidate 
or political organization puts forth about the opponent.274 Here, 
the suggested eligibility requirement targets false statements 
about the individual’s own résumé. In this situation, public 
officials are certainly able to bear this burden. Further, 
targeting this type of speech does not raise the same concerns 
of voter alienation and extensive litigation among opponents. 
The eligibility requirement would also circumvent the 
constitutional problems implicated by criminally sanctioning 
campaign speech because the “integrity of the electoral process” 
would be preserved in a less restrictive manner.275 
In addition to a lack of criminalization, the eligibility 
requirement is further distinguishable from all of the statutes at 
issue in Brown, Garrison and Vote No!. In Brown, the statute 
sanctions speech that operates prospectively, whereas the 
misrepresentations in the eligibility requirement would target 
speech about one’s past.276 In Garrison, the statute targeted 
statements made with actual malice, without regard to whether 
those false statements were made knowingly or were in fact false.277 
Thus, the statute criminalized truthful statements as well as 
inadvertent or mistaken false statements.278 In Vote No!, the statute 
sanctioned false statements made with actual malice.279 While the 
statute did not criminalize truthful statements, it still had the 
ability to sanction inadvertent or mistaken false statements.280 
Thus, the imposition of this eligibility requirement, 
which expressly prohibits individuals from obtaining or 
maintaining a government position if they misrepresent their 
military history, would likely provide a permissible and 
effective source of accountability. 
Interestingly, if the eligibility requirement and the 
specialized fraud statute were enacted together, the eligibility 
requirement would enhance the effectiveness of the fraud statute. 
Prosecutors could not charge political candidates under the 
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specific fraud statute due to the difficulty in establishing 
individualized detrimental reliance amongst voters. But the 
eligibility requirement would aid in expanding the reach of the 
fraud statute by holding politicians, such as Blumenthal or Kirk, 
accountable for their misrepresentations. Additionally, if public 
officials are held accountable for their misrepresentations, the 
publicity such political scandals receive will aid in enhancing the 
deterrence of the same behavior in private citizens by illustrating 
the ramifications of this behavior and exemplifying equality of 
treatment amongst the rulers and the people. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 is unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment because it is a content-based 
restriction on speech that fails to satisfy strict scrutiny. Under 
First Amendment principles, however, the type of speech the 
Stolen Valor Act seeks to prevent is not the type of speech the 
framers sought to protect. Due to the history of protecting 
military valor in the United States and the increased number of 
false representations of military service, legislators must take 
another path to deter this type of behavior. While Congress has 
begun an attempt at revising the Act, the proposed legislation is 
still unlikely to pass constitutional muster. Thus, Congress 
should instead restructure the Act to resemble a fraud statute. In 
addition, state and local governments should hold public officials 
accountable for such misrepresentations. An effective method of 
doing so would be to impose an eligibility requirement that 
prohibits, for individuals seeking an elected position, false claims 
of military valor and service. Overall, false claims of military 
valor are worth policing in some way. Legislatures should 
revitalize their original initiative behind the Stolen Valor Act of 
2005 and invoke the aforementioned constitutional alternatives. 
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